Man, Morality, and the United States Constitution by Lambright, Daniel
  
1487 
MAN, MORALITY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Daniel Lambright∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution, in popular consciousness, is often 
treated as though it miraculously sprang up from the minds of a 
group of enlightened statesmen.  Although this conception of the 
founding of the United States government works well as a founda-
tional myth, it does not accurately characterize the deep level of debt 
the Framers of the Constitution owed to the intellectual traditions of 
the previous two centuries.  Hundreds of years of philosophical in-
quiry into the nature of man conditioned their perspectives on these 
issues.  Indeed, the Framers’ views on moral philosophy were influen-
tial in the crafting of the structure of the new American republic.  
The greatest intellectual traditions that guided the Framers’ views on 
morality and politics were the developments in natural law theory 
and Scottish Enlightenment thought. 
This Comment is an investigation into the moral theories that in-
fluenced the Framers in crafting the structural elements of the Unit-
ed States’ federal republic.  Part I will explore the deep link between 
the natural law theorists, Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, and 
the Framers.  Part II will delve deeper into natural law theory and 
Scottish Enlightenment thought.  Part II.A, of this section, will exam-
ine the relevant key tenets of sixteenth and seventeenth century natu-
ral law theory, with special attention paid to the works of Hugo Gro-
tius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke.  Part II.B will examine the 
key tenets of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, primarily exploring 
the works of Francis Hutchenson, Thomas Reid, and David Hume.  
Part III will focus on the incorporation of these philosophical insights 
on morality and human nature into the United States Constitution.  
This section will involve the discovery of important fissures between 
the Framers on their conception of man.  Framer James Wilson’s and 
the authors’ of The Federalist (John Jay, James Madison, and Alexan-
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der Hamilton) theories of man and government will be explicated to 
illuminate crucial differences.  The final section, Part IV, will center 
on the implications of these differences for an American jurispru-
dence that places great weight on originalism. 
I.  SOURCES OF EARLY AMERICAN THOUGHT 
The Framers of the Constitution were influenced immensely by 
the intellectual world in which they were born.  The political writings 
of the colonists reveal they were well versed in a variety of sources 
from classical antiquity to contemporaneous developments.  Ancient 
Greek and Roman sources cited by the colonists included Homer, 
Plato, Aristotle, Vergil, Seneca, and Cato.1  These theorists provided 
the conceptual lense for how the colonists viewed their condition.  
For the colonists, their time was one of encroaching tyranny.  Just like 
the enlightened statesmen of Rome, they were witnessing the destruc-
tion of a land once “full of virtue:  simplicity, patriotism, integrity, a 
love of justice and of liberty . . . .”2  Similar in establishing the para-
noid mindset of the colonists, and even more influential in driving 
the logic of the American Revolution, was the Whig Party in Eng-
land.3  The colonists took seriously the Whigs’ conspiracies and false 
prophecies of tyranny and enslavement that would soon befall Brit-
ain.4  English common law and American Puritanism were also influ-
ential sources of American colonial thought.5  In structuring the gov-
ernment, however, the two most intellectually important influences 
were natural law theory—the idea that man-made law and moral 
principles share a deep connection6—and Scottish Enlightenment 
thought.7 
The Framers of the United States Constitution were versed in nat-
ural law theory and early Enlightenment rationalism.  Their exposure 
to natural law theorists came while they were young men.  Young co-
lonial men were introduced to theorists like Locke and Pufendorf in 
their boyhood, teenage years, and again in university as part of their 
 
 1 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24 
(1967). 
 2 Id. at 25–26. 
 3 Id. at 34. 
 4 Id. at 34–54. 
 5 Id. at 30–32. 
 6 See BAILYN, supra note 1, at 26–27; see also KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY:  FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 312 (1996). 
 7 See James J.S. Foster, Introduction to SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA, at i (James J.S. Fos-
ter ed., 2012). 
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teachings in moral philosophy.8  While in university, men of the 
Framers’ generation would be subjected to lectures based around 
support or refutation of “Christian utilitarian principles.”9  Training 
in natural law theory was an important and pervasive part of Ameri-
can colonial education.  This education in the natural law tradition is 
reflected in the political writings of the colonists.10  The pamphlets 
the colonists used to disseminate their political messages are filled 
with citations to natural law theorists.11  As Bernard Bailyn notes, 
“[T]he American writers cited Locke on natural rights and on the so-
cial and governmental contract . . . Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, 
and Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on the principles 
of civil government.”12  Though the citations were frequent, they were 
not always used in a philosophically robust manner.13  Mostly, around 
the time of the Revolution, the sources were interpreted broadly 
enough to be used by both loyalists and revolutionaries in denounc-
ing each other’s positions.14  The works of the natural law theorists 
are even found in the libraries of the Framers.15  It is estimated that 
the most popular book in American colonial libraries was Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.16  An estimate by David 
Lundberg and Henry F. May suggests that 45% of personal libraries 
contained Locke’s Essay.17  By the time the Revolutionaries became 
the Framers, they had been long immersed in the language of natural 
law theory and English rationalism. 
The Framers were also intimately associated with the work of the 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment.  Scottish Enlightenment 
philosophy was another integral part of American colonial education.  
Scottish immigrants filled the faculties and administration of colonial 
institutions like Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Penn, and William and 
Mary.18  Thomas Jefferson was tutored by a Scottish teacher at William 
and Mary, while Madison attended Princeton during the presidency 
of Scotsman John Witherspoon.19  Witherspoon turned Princeton in-
 
 8 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 323. 
 9 Id. at 324. 
 10 BAILYN, supra note 1, at 26; HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 325. 
 11 BAILYN, supra note 1, at 27. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 28. 
 14 Id. at 29. 
 15 See Robert A. Rutland, Madison’s Bookish Habits, 37 THE Q. J. OF THE LIBR. OF CONG. 176, 
181, 183 (1980). 
 16 See MARK G. SPENCER, DAVID HUME AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (2005). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Foster, supra note 7, at 2. 
 19 Id. 
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to a repository of Scottish Enlightenment thought and introduced 
young, eager minds—like that of James Madison—to the major Scot-
tish Enlightenment thinkers.20 
Some of the Framers had personal connections to Scottish En-
lightenment figures.  Framer James Wilson is an example of this con-
nection.  Wilson was born in Scotland and was educated at the Uni-
versity of St. Andrews during the height of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.21  Wilson continued to study the Scottish Enlighten-
ment philosophers after he graduated from St. Andrews before he 
eventually immigrated to the United States and became a lawyer.22  
Benjamin Franklin also had a personal connection to the Scottish En-
lightenment.  A good deal older than most of the Framers, Franklin 
was approximately the same age as Scottish Enlightenment figures 
David Hume and Thomas Reid.  Franklin struck up a personal rela-
tionship with Hume, visiting him twice in Scotland in 1759 and 
1771.23  The two kept a correspondence back and forth discussing 
matters of science, politics, and religion.24 
The men who would structure the government of the United 
States were well connected to the intellectual climate surrounding 
them.  They were taught the great intellectual icons of natural law, 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, and they were more directly versed in 
the nearly contemporary intellectual developments going on in 
eighteenth century Scotland. 
II.  THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE FRAMERS 
In order to completely understand the manifestation of the Euro-
pean intellectual traditions reflected in the United States govern-
ment, those traditions must be examined in greater detail.  Since 
natural law theory and Scottish Enlightenment thought were equally 
influential in shaping the generation of men who would establish the 
United States government, the following section is a general survey of 
the relevant ideas of both of these intellectual movements. 
 
 20 Id. at 3; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 3 (3d ed. 2007). 
 21 LIBRARY OF SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 55 (James J.S. Fos-
ter ed., 2012); see William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 901, 902 (2008). 
 22 Ewald, supra note 21, at 903–04. 
 23 SPENCER, supra note 16, at 53–54. 
 24 Id. at 54–62. 
May 2015] MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1491 
 
A.  Natural Law Theory 
Although natural law theory has ancient and medieval roots, the 
strand that most influenced the American Framers developed and 
matured in the time directly preceding the Enlightenment and its 
early stages.25  The seventeenth century is often referred to as “the 
century of genius” primarily for the large change in gestalt that oc-
curred.26  While the late seventeenth century is often pegged as the 
starting point of the Enlightenment, the work done by Francis Bacon, 
Isaac Newton, John Locke, as well as the natural lawyers in the early 
part of the century, paved the way for the latter movement. 27  These 
thinkers forever changed how people view phenomena, shifting ex-
planation away from the use of tradition and towards the use of rea-
son.28  Early Enlightenment thinkers were motivated by a “systematic 
spirit.”29  No endeavor, be it practical or theoretical, escaped their 
quest to produce rational and systematic explanations of the world 
around them.30  The natural law theorists, Hugo Grotius, Samuel 
Pufendorf, and John Locke, extended this quest to morality.  They 
sought to understand morality and God’s role in moral laws in a le-
galistic way consistent with new, Protestant ideas about God and his 
role in the affairs of man.31  Furthermore, they sought a systematic 
account of how positive law, the laws of men, fit with the laws of mo-
rality.32 
 
1.  Reason and Moral Epistemology 
 
The natural law theorists of the seventeenth century placed a 
strong importance on human reason and the ability to figure out 
moral truths.  This shift toward reason was the result of the shift away 
from a god who was directly involved in human and earthly affairs.33  
The Protestant God was a god who was with disconnected from man.  
 
 25 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 15. 
 26 See LEONARD KRIEGER, KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS 1689–1789 (1970) (noting that enlight-
enment thinkers tried to explain the world by use of rationality rather than appeals to re-
ligious traditions). 
 27 Id. at 138–39. 
 28 Id. at 139. 
 29 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30 Id. at 142. 
 31 See T. J. HOCHSTRASSER, NATURAL LAW THEORIES IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT 2–3 
(2000) (suggesting that the German Protestants recognized distinctive spheres of divine 
law and human natural law and debated over how to reconcile the two). 
 32 Id. at 4. 
 33 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 25. 
1492 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
The link between man and God was through human reason. 34  It was 
through reason that man could ascertain the right and wrong actions 
to take.35  There were two different views on the method of reasoning 
to arrive at God’s law.  Grotius favored an inductive method to arrive 
at natural law.  On the Grotian account, in order to arrive at the nat-
ural laws an examiner needed to explore the positive laws and cus-
toms of various countries.36  Later successors, Pufendorf and Locke, 
would reject this inductive methodology and seek to explain 
knowledge of natural law and moral principles through deductive 
reasoning. 
Pufendorf endorsed a program that Locke would later develop in 
a more thorough manner.37  Locke argued in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding that morals were capable of demonstration.  
Locke stated: 
I suppose, if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of 
our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the Sci-
ences capable of Demonstration:  wherein I doubt not, but from self-
evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences . . . the measures of 
right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply him-
self . . . .38 
Locke believed that morality works like a geometric proof.  In figur-
ing out the morally right action, all one needs to do is to reason from 
axiomatic truths.  This has two implications for the Lockean picture 
of morality.  First, the knowledge of moral duties and rules of action 
are not innate in humans.39  This position is consistent with his argu-
ments against innatism in the earlier part of Essay and his famous tab-
ula rasa doctrine.40  Second, morality is beyond the realm of sensa-
tion, which contrasts with his empricist program for other sources of 
knowledge.41 
For the natural law theorists, natural law and morality were, like 
mathematics, supposed to be derived through human reason.  Ra-
 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 HOCHSTRASSER, supra note 31, at 53. 
 37 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 52. 
 38 I JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 351 (Alexander Campbell 
Fraser ed., n.d.) (emphasis omitted). 
 39 See HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 53 (discussing how culture plays a role in establishing 
customs and laws); see also J. B. SCHNEEWIND, Locke’s Moral Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO LOCKE 200 (Vere Chappell ed., 1994) (describing how Locke specifically 
denied that morality has innate characteristics). 
 40 See LOCKE, supra note 38, at 37 (arguing against the idea that there are innate principle in 
mind, referred to as his tabula rasa or black slate argument). 
 41 See DAVID OWEN, HUME’S REASON 30 (1999) (stating that Locke thought that we are able 
to form beliefs that extend beyond the senses or memory through probable reasoning). 
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tionality was the hallmark of humanity and was supposed to allow 
man to understand the desires of a god who was no longer directly 
interacting in earthly affairs. 
 
2.  Rights and Duties 
 
For natural law theorists, the starting point for the substantive ac-
count of natural rights and duties was with individuals.  Grotius shift-
ed the discussion of natural law away from perfectionism and law di-
rected at how man should act to achieve the highest good, to a theory 
of individual rights.42  On the Grotian picture, individuals’ rights were 
prior to all positive law.  Another crucial element was that all individ-
uals had these rights.43  In constructing society, on Grotius’s account, 
individuals cede some rights but retain others in order to function in 
a community.  Thus, positive law is created to protect those rights 
which man did not give up.44  For Grotius the primary natural law was 
not to violate others’ rights.45  Violations of these rights were ultimate-
ly subject to a sanction by God.46 
Pufendorf and Locke both make an important split with Grotius.  
In their natural law theories, God has a much more direct role than a 
mere giver of sanctions.  On the Pufendorfian account, God created a 
world that was both physical and moral.47  Both parts of the world 
God created are self-contained and distinct.  Whereas value is objec-
tive in the physical word, in the moral world, value is created by hu-
mans.  Though man creates value in this world, his creation of value 
is derived from God’s natural law.48  Thus, rights and duties are not 
derived from the agreements of men but ultimately from natural 
laws.49  Both Locke and Pufendorf hold that natural rights are “pow-
ers to fulfill the fundamental duty of natural law.”50  The core focus of 
natural law for both theorists was to promote self-preservation and 
the preservation of humanity.51 
 
 
 42 SCHNEEWIND, supra note 39, at 209; HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 28. 
 43 SCHNEEWIND, supra note 39, at 209–10. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 HAAKONSSEN, supra note 6, at 38. 
 48 Id. at 38–43. 
 49 Id. at 40. 
 50 Id. at 55. 
 51 Id. 
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B.  Scottish Enlightenment Philosophy 
 
The second major source of philosophical influence was the phi-
losophy of the Scottish Enlightenment.  This intellectual movement 
occurred during the mid-to-late parts of the eighteenth century.  The 
major developments of the movement were contemporary with the 
lives of the Framers.  Though there were agreements between the 
natural law theorists and the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, 
the latter produced their own very influential philosophy.  Some of 
the themes in the Scottish Enlightenment explored here include 
(a) moral epistemology, (b) theory of humans as social animals, and 
(c) theory of action. 
 
1.  Moral Epistemology 
 
Within the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers there were two major 
contrasting views on how man could discover moral truths in the uni-
verse.  David Hume and Thomas Reid presented vastly different pic-
tures of the moral world.  David Hume’s philosophy is known for its 
empiricism and skepticism.  Contra natural law theorists, Hume was 
skeptical of all systems of morality and argued against the idea that 
morals could be derived at through reason.  Moral propositions, for 
Hume, were very different than the natural law theorists before him.  
In A Treatise of Human Nature, he describes morality in the following 
way: 
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because 
its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind . . . . To have 
the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind 
from the contemplation of a character.  The very feeling constitutes our 
praise or admiration.  We go no farther; nor do we enquire into the 
cause of the satisfaction.  We do not infer a character to be virtuous, be-
cause it pleases:  But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular 
manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.  The case is the same as in our 
judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.  
Our approbation is imply’d [sic] in the immediate pleasure they convey 
to us.52 
Moral propositions, for Hume, were not statements of an objective 
truth but rather were statements of subjective feelings.  On the 
Humean account, when one speaks of an action being “bad” or a 
“vice,” one is only really saying that the action causes discomfort or 
pain.  The deductive certainty of Locke’s moral world does not exist 
 
 52 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 303 (Norton & Norton, eds., 2005) (1738) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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in the Humean picture.53  It follows that Hume’s moral epistemology 
is based not on reasoned deduction but rather on a psychological 
empirical investigation into the causes of pleasures and pains for hu-
mans. 
Hume argues that his empiricist program works for political truths 
as well.  Hume envisioned politics as a science.54  Propositional state-
ments on the governmental structures necessary for society were to 
be arrived at empirically.55  In order to arrive at these truths, agents 
need only investigate the historical record.56  On the Humean pic-
ture, political scientists can look through history, and look at the ac-
tions of men in history, to devise political truths.  Hume’s political 
truth that man cannot be trusted with unlimited power is not ascer-
tainable from natural laws, but rather from the accumulation of his-
torical facts that all men who have had absolute power became ty-
rants.57 
Thomas Reid provides a different view of morality.  Reid argues 
that moral judgments relate to propositions about what is actually 
right and wrong and not merely what one feels.58  Reid continues to 
lay out an almost intermediary account between rationalism and em-
piricism on moral truths.  Reid posits that there exists a moral sense.59  
This moral sense produces moral judgments gathered from evi-
dence.60  William C. Davis reconstructs Reid’s moral psychology and 
epistemology as involving “(a) formulating conceptions of an agent 
and her action, (b) the moral sense determining the moral relation 
sustained by the agent-action pair, and (c) the faculty of judgment 
being convinced by the unhesitant testimony of the moral sense.”61  
Also available for understanding one’s moral duties, on the Reidian 
 
 53 See FRANCIS SNARE, MORALS, MOTIVATION AND CONVENTION:  HUME’S INFLUENTIAL 
DOCTRINES 14 (1991) (stating that Hume claims moral judgments are not rationally de-
rived by deduction or other modes of inference). 
 54 MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1987). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at 19 (pointing to historical records as “collections of experiments” that can be 
studied scientifically); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, DAVID HUME:  MORAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORIST 108–11 (2007) (stating that history evidences how power derives from increas-
ing fitness, or “coordination,” and that power expands as it is used). 
 58 Keith Lehrer, Reid, the Moral Faculty, and First Principles, in REID ON ETHICS 25, 29 (Sabine 
Roeser ed., 2010). 
 59 Id. at 25; see Alexander Broadie, Reid Making Sense of Moral Sense, in REID ON ETHICS 91, 91 
(Sabine Roeser ed., 2010). 
 60 Broadie, supra note 59, at 91; see Lehrer, supra note 58, at 25. 
 61 WILLIAM C. DAVIS, THOMAS REID’S ETHICS:  MORAL ESPISTEMOLOGY ON LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS 95 (2006). 
1496 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
picture, are certain morally self-evident principles.62  It is through ap-
peals to these principles that individuals sharpen and fine-tune their 
moral sense and moral judgments of the right course of action. 63  
The moral sense helps individuals apply general moral truths to par-
ticular situations. 
Reid developed his moral philosophy from the works of early 
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Francis Hutchenson and English 
philosopher Bishop John Butler.64  Both Hume and Reid’s moral phi-
losophies, though vastly different, reflect the commitment that the 
Scots had for empiricism and the experiential gathering of 
knowledge. 
 
2.  Man as a Social Animal 
 
Also prevalent in Scottish Enlightenment philosophy was an ar-
gument against psychological egoism.  The psychological egoism ar-
gued against by most of these philosophers was devised by Thomas 
Hobbes.  The Scottish Enlightenment philosophers took the Hobbes-
ian man to be purely self interested.65  The first element in the refuta-
tion of this conception of man was an argument against the state of 
nature hypothetical.66  Rather than abstracting from the hypothetical 
man in hypothetical situations, these philosophers examined actual 
men and actual societies.67  From their empiricism, they argued that 
man, at his core, is a social creature and that this sociality cannot be 
reduced to mere egoism.  Most of the theorists agree that there are 
three general reasons that explain the sociality of man.  First, many of 
the philosophers explain that man has an instinct for society.68  This 
instinct for society is best demonstrated by his development of lan-
guage to communicate with other members of his society.69  Second, 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers pointed to the family as an ex-
planation of the sociality of man. 70  Humans have natural inclinations 
 
 62 Id. at 110. 
 63 Id. 
 64 For discussions of pre- and early Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, see generally FRANCIS 
HUTCHESON, ON HUMAN NATURE:  REFLECTIONS ON OUR COMMON SYSTEMS OF MORALITY 
ON THE SOCIAL NATURE OF MAN (Thomas Mautner ed., 1993) and TERENCE PENELHUM, 
BUTLER (1985). 
 65 See CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, SOCIAL THEORY OF THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 30–31 
(1997). 
 66 Id. at 24. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 25. 
 69 Id. at 27. 
 70 Id. 
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to produce children and have relations with the opposite sex, accord-
ing to the philosophers, which necessitate social relationships.71  Fi-
nally, humans have bonds of friendship and loyalty which are both 
strong and transcend self-interest.72  The ability for man to risk his life 
out of loyalty or friendship was a capacity that a reductive account of 
psychological egoism could not explain.73 
 
3.  Theory of Action 
 
Though the general consensus was against philosophical egoism, 
there were divergent views on the role of self-interest and rationality 
in motivating man to act.  Hume’s theory of action relies on his earli-
er theory of the passions and will.  On the Humean picture, the pas-
sions of man (i.e., emotions and desires) are primarily divided into 
direct and indirect passions.74  Direct passions are those which arise 
immediately from the actions of good or bad and pain or pleasure.75  
An example of a direct passion is aversion.  If a child gets shocked by 
an electrical socket they will avert that feeling.  Indirect passions are 
more complex in that they require both the feeling and an idea.76  
One of the examples of an indirect passion, for Hume, is pride.77  
Hume argues that it is these passions, both direct and indirect, that 
control how men act.78  Reason alone does nothing.  When a man is 
burned when touching a hot stove, it is not reason alone that pro-
vides him with the motivation to act, it is the passion of aversion pro-
duced by the stimulus that causes his action.  Reason may, on the 
Humean account, direct action or guide judgment but it alone is 
never sufficient to cause human actions.79  The causal inefficacy of 
reason alone is what grounds Hume’s famous statement:  “Reason is, 
and ought only be the slave of passions . . . .”80 
Reid presents a different picture of human action.  On his ac-
count there are three principles of action.  These principles are me-
chanical principles, animal principles, and rational principles of ac-
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 28e 
 73 Id. 
 74 HUME, supra note 52, at 335. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 335–36. 
 77 Id. at 335. 
 78 Id. at 318. 
 79 Id. at 318. 
 80 Id. 
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tion.81  By mechanical principles, Reid means those acts taken without 
the use of will.  These are best thought of as instincts or habits.82  An-
imal principles are those with intentional properties that do not pre-
suppose the use of reason.  Reid considers passions, desires, and ap-
petites to be animal principles.83  Finally, rational principles require 
judgment, meaning that they require reason.84  He argues, contra 
Hume, that certain ends can only be conceived of through the use of 
reason.  These ends that require the use of reason are conceptions of 
the good, which in turn are sufficient to produce action.85  It is this 
ability to form general principles that produce rational principles of 
action that separate man from brutes only focused on particular pre-
sent objects.86 
In summation, Scottish Enlightenment moral and political theory 
took a step back from the rationalism of the previous century.  
Whether it was the decentralization of reason by Hume in his quest to 
create the “science of man,” or his foe Thomas Reid’s common sense 
philosophy, both eschewed a moral philosophy based in pure reason.  
Hume and Reid (as well as the other Scottish Enlightenment think-
ers) laid down a fertile soil for intellectual debate and for men across 
the Atlantic Ocean to craft a constitution. 
III.  THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN FRAMERS 
Much has been written about the philosophical traditions in The 
Federalist, whereas less has been written about the philosophical tradi-
tions found in James Wilson’s Lectures on Law.  Though by all ac-
counts Wilson was one of the most theoretically sophisticated Fram-
ers, he has largely been forgotten.  Despite his obscurity, Wilson was 
one of the most influential individuals at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, contributing vigorously to the debates as well as to the docu-
ment produced.87  Thus, it is important to carefully analyze the tradi-
tions found in both The Federalist and Wilson’s Lectures on Law to 
arrive at a true picture of the philosophical commitments of the most 
influential Framers. 
 
 81 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reid on Justice, in REID ON ETHICS 187, 187 (Sabine Roeser ed., 
2010). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 188. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 189. 
 86 Wolterstorff, supra note 81, at 190. 
 87 See Ewald, supra note 21, 901–02 (discussing how James Wilson had many accomplish-
ments for which he did not receive recognition). 
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A. The Philosophy of The Federalist 
The Federalist represents an amalgamation of the philosophical 
traditions of the proceeding centuries.  There is a mix of natural law 
moral insights as well as Scottish Enlightenment theory.  Particularly, 
David Hume’s arguments were very influential in crafting the argu-
ment in Madison’s Federalist No. 10. 
1. The Moral Epistemology of The Federalist 
In addition to Thomas Jefferson’s rhetoric in the Declaration of 
Independence, Publius88 also endorses a Reidian epistemology re-
garding moral and political truths.  Hamilton opens Federalist No. 31, 
a continuation of the defense of the power of taxation found in the 
Constitution, with a discussion of truth.  Hamilton states: 
In disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths, or first 
principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.  These 
contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or com-
bination, commands the assent of the mind.  Where it produces not this 
effect, it must proceed either from some disorder in the organs of per-
ception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or 
prejudice.  Of this nature are the maxims in geometry . . . . Of the same 
nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics . . . . And there are 
other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to 
rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and 
so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisti-
cated dictates of common-sense . . . .89 
He goes on to argue that moral and political principles, though 
less certain as those principles of geometry and mathematics, work in 
the same way.90  Consistent with Reidian thought, Hamilton argues 
that, in the realm of morality and politics, people often let their pas-
sions and biases cloud their common sense analysis of axiomatic 
principles.91  Hamilton then goes on to derive the power of the gov-
ernment to tax citizens from these common sense axiomatic moral 
truths.92  This move allows Hamilton to argue that the individuals who 
oppose the Constitution are blinded by their passions and have failed 
to be guided by reason. 
 
 88 “Publius” was the pseudonym under which Madison, Jay, and Hamilton published THE 
FEDERALIST.  Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at vii (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).  When re-
ferring to all three authors I will use “Publius.” 
 89 THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 at 189 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 90 Id. at 190. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 190–91. 
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This section shows Publius’s (or at least Hamilton’s) commitment 
to Scottish common sense moral epistemology.  Like in Lockean the-
ory, Publius treats certain moral and political truths as axiomatic 
principles.  But consistent with Reid and Common Sense Scottish phi-
losophy, those axiomatic principles are attainted through introspec-
tion on common sense principles. 
2.  The Moral Psychology of The Federalist 
While The Federalist may endorse a Common Sense and, perhaps, 
Lockean understanding of moral epistemology, the authors’ under-
standing of man’s nature and moral psychology is much more in-
debted to David Hume.  The two places in which the arguments 
about human nature do the most work are in Federalist No. 10 and Fed-
eralist No. 51. 
In Federalist No. 10, Madison argues for the extended republic.93  
In arguing for the extended republic, he argues against Montesquieu, 
who stated that only small territories could house republican gov-
ernments, by advancing a thoroughly Humean argument.94  The ma-
jor problem for a democratic republican form of government, for 
Madison, was the faction.95  Madison believed that the faction served 
as an immense threat to liberty and the well being of the country.  
Madison defines the faction as: 
[A] number of citizens, whether amounting to amajority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.96 
As Morton White notes, this definition puts Madison in line with 
Hume’s writings on factions.97  Hume and Madison believe that the 
 
 93 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
 94 See WHITE, supra note 54, at 96; see also Daniel C. Howe, The Political Psychology of The Fed-
eralist, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 502, 507–08 (1987). 
 95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 93, at 71–72 . 
 96 Id. at 72. 
 97 WHITE, supra note 54, at 97–99.  Hume himself in Of Parties in General, states: 
Real factions may be divided into those from interest, from principle, and 
from affection.  Ofall factions, the first are the most reasonable, and the most ex-
cusable.  Where two orders of men, such as the nobles and people, have a distinct 
authority in a government, not very accurately balanced and modelled, they natu-
rally follow a distinct interest; nor can we reasonably expect a different conduct, 
considering that degree of selfishness implanted in human nature.  It requires 
great skill in a legislator to prevent such parties; and many philosophers are of 
opinion, that this secret, like the grand elixir, or perpetual motion, may amuse men in 
theory, but can never possibly be reduced to practice. 
  DAVID HUME, Of Parties in General, in 3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 54, 58 
(1854). 
May 2015] MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1501 
 
problem with factions are that they are self-interested on particular 
goods, while not interested in the greater societal well being.98  This 
focus on the good of the particular group maximizes the good of that 
group at the expense of the whole community, which in turn pro-
duces tyranny. 
After providing a Humean definition of factions, Madison goes on 
to solve the problem.  Madison states that the problem can be solved 
either by controlling the “causes” or “effects” of factions.99  One such 
cause of factions is liberty.  Liberty to associate and form groups is a 
necessity for faction formation.  Madison easily rejects the idea of 
eliminating liberty to control factions as absurd.100  The second cause 
of factions is differences in opinions, passions, and interests.  In order 
to eliminate this cause of factions, the state would have to give “to 
every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same in-
terests.”101  In response to this solution, Madison declares that men 
will naturally have different opinions, passions, and interests: 
As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, 
his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each 
other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach them-
selves.  The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of 
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of 
interests.102 
Madison continues on to explain how differences in skill, property, 
and religion will always produce a diversity of passions, opinions, and 
interests.103  This pessimistic note concludes Madison’s discussion on 
the causes of factions.  On the Madisonian picture, factions cannot be 
erased by their causes and thus are an innate part of any society that 
values liberty. 
Madison’s solution to the problem comes in controlling the ef-
fects of factions.  Controlling the effects of minority factions is not a 
problem in a democracy.  Minority factions will be controlled by a 
democratic check.104  Essentially, Americans have recourse against 
minority factions through outvoting their interests.  Controlling the 
effects of larger factions however is a problem.  Majority factions are 
to be kept in line by the extended republic because the expansive 
scope of the republic creates a space with more interests, passions, 
 
 98 See WHITE, supra note 54, at 109. 
 99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 93, at 72. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 72–73. 
102 Id. at 73. 
103 Id. 
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 93, at 75. 
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and opinions and thus, more factions.105  Since there will be more fac-
tions and those factions will occupy more space, they will ultimately 
keep each other in check and fight against other factions’ attempts to 
gain power and impose tyranny. 
Federalist No. 51 also provides this same type of argumentation for 
checks and balances and federalism.  Madison famously states:  “If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary.  If angels were 
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary.”106  This is a statement that man in his nature can 
be self interested and power seeking to the point of the destruction 
of liberty.  Thus, liberty preservation requires two additional checks 
on this nature of man.  The first check is to control the powers of the 
ruler.  This check on the ruler’s power is through dividing the func-
tions of government among distinct minimally dependent branch-
es.107  The second security against tyranny is the division of power be-
tween the federal government and state governments.108  Madison 
states:  “Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.  
The different governments will control each other, at the same time 
that each will be controlled by itself.”109 
While it is clear the extended republic argument and the argu-
ments on governmental power ultimately derive from Hume and 
Montesquieu, there is some argument that the moral psychology is 
based actually in Reidian philosophy.110  Though there may be some 
truth to that position, the argument for the extended republic cannot 
succeed without a Humean moral psychology.  The reason why fac-
tions are problematic and why their causes cannot be controlled is 
because they are influenced by what White calls “particular passions” 
and these passions cannot be made the same.111  Individuals in fac-
tions focus on their own self interest, desires, and passions and not 
those of the aggregate whole.  This conception of factions requires 
that passions are stronger than reasons.  Further, Madison states in 
Federalist No. 55, “[P]assion never fails to wrest the scepter from rea-
son.”112  Madison believed that it would be futile to try to use reason 
 
105 Id. at 78. 
106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 320. 
109 Id. 
110 See Howe, supra note 94, at 489–90 (discussing how Publius adopted aspects of the “hu-
man faculties” described by Thomas Ried, including “passions,” “affections,” and “self-
interest”). 
111 WHITE, supra note 54, at 109. 
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 340 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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to motivate men in factions to act for the good of the whole of the 
country.  Man’s own selfish interests and particular passions motivate 
his actions and causally move him.  Since reasons are slaves to pas-
sions, interests, and desires, the only way to solve the problem of the 
faction is to extend the republic. 
The follower of a Reidian moral psychology would need a differ-
ent argument to extend the republic.  For Reid, a reasoned concep-
tion of the good is an essential part of human motivation.  Sure, there 
are animalistic principles of motivations and passions, which cloud 
his conception of the general good, but those can all be regulated by 
appeals to common sense principles of morals attainable to all men.  
On the Reidian picture it must be the case that men in factions can 
be morally educated to see those common sense moral principles and 
thus, as rational agents, motivate themselves to work toward the bene-
fit of the whole.  For Reidians, particular conceptions of the good of 
one faction, as the expense of the common good, will dissipate as 
one’s understanding of the common sense moral principles strength-
en.  If Madison was a Reidian he would need a stronger argument as 
to why giving everyone the same reasons and understandings of the 
moral principles of the world could not motivate their behavior to 
work for the common good of the country.  Madison does not pro-
vide this argument, what he instead says is that differences in interests 
and essentially innate and unchangeable.  Madison’s argument in The 
Federalist needs a self-interested man whose conception of the com-
mon good is causally weak in order to craft out their structures of 
dispersing power. 
B. The Philosophy of James Wilson’s Lectures on Law 
James Wilson has been noted as one of the most philosophically 
developed of the Framers.  His Lectures on Law113 of 1791–1792 repre-
sent a comprehensive treatment of American jurisprudence.  The 
work stands as theoretically sophisticated because of its reliance on 
moral and political philosophy.114  Wilson builds his distinctly Ameri-
can jurisprudence from a theory of man and natural law. 
 
113 See generally 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 
1895). 
114 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, As an Individual, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 206 (James 
DeWitt Andrews ed., 1895) [hereinafter As an Individual]. 
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1. Wilson’s Moral Psychology 
The main portions of the Lectures on Law where Wilson expounds 
a theory of moral psychology are the “Of Man” sections.  These sec-
tions work to set the foundation for his justification of the American 
Constitution and the formation of a new American jurisprudence.  
Early in Of Man, as an Individual, Wilson echoes the Scottish Enlight-
enment attack on the Hobbesian use of a hypothetical state of nature 
argument to derive truths about human nature.  Wilson, like his fel-
low Scots, believed truths about man could only be derived through 
empirical investigation.115 
From this point, Wilson continues on to describe man’s psycholo-
gy.  He holds that the mind is made up of numerous operations and 
principles that interact with each other.  The mind, for Wilson, con-
tains active and passive principles.  Active principles are those of sen-
sation, imagination, memory, and judgment.116  Among those active 
principles, Wilson calls the senses “the useful and pleasing ministers 
of our higher powers.”117  Even though the senses act as the ministers 
of the higher powers they must still be regulated by temperance and 
prudence in order to not turn into vice and pain.118  He breaks down 
the senses into internal and external senses.  External senses are 
senses focused on objects outside of ourselves.  These sensations, for 
Wilson, are what cause pleasure and virtue in our lives, when placed 
under proper guidance.119  Internal senses, on the other hand, are 
those senses that give us information about what goes on in our inner 
world.120  Consciousness is an internal sense.121  Borrowing from Reid, 
he argues that these inner states are essentially subjective and gain 
their proof primarily from the fact there is a sensor and that that sen-
sor has accurate phenomenological access to their inner world.122  
The proof that an individual is in pain is because the individual feels 
pain.  One cannot, on this picture, prove the existence of an inner 
world sensation through reason and logic as Cartesian rationalism at-
tempted.123  Wilson uses Descartes’ failures to ground his argument 
 
115 Id. at 208–09. 
116 Id. at 214. 
117 Id. at 218. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 216–17. 
120 Id. at 219. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 220. 
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that there exist first principles that are not the product of reason but 
rather that all reason must flow from.124 
2.  Moral Psychology, Society, and Government 
Wilson progresses to apply the insights about man’s mind to socie-
ty and ultimately the United States’ system of government.  Wilson 
begins Of Man, as a Member of Society, again, with a discussion of psy-
chological egoism much in line with Scottish Enlightenment philoso-
phy.  Wilson advances several pieces of empirical evidence to discred-
it psychological egoism.  The first piece of evidence is that human 
lives are horrid in solitary confinement.125  He also notes that humans 
have social affections that are other-regarding and cannot be reduced 
to mere self interest.126  Humans also have faculties of the mind that 
are social in nature.  Testimony, contract, promises, and language all 
do not make sense without social interaction.127  Wilson paints a pic-
ture of psychological development that places sociality as coming be-
fore the development of reason.128 
For Wilson, the sociability of man is the starting point for building 
the state.  Wilson argues that man’s happiness is dependent upon so-
ciety.  He states, “Take away society, and you destroy the basis, on 
which the preservation and happiness of human life are laid.”129  Es-
sentially, Wilson argues that man in the state of nature is weak.  In 
solitude, humans are weak and are surrounded by danger.130  Society 
provides individuals aid and remedies for disease and allows for the 
enjoyment of social pleasures innate in the human mind.131  Since 
human happiness is accomplished through the interactions with soci-
ety, the function of society is to produce a system that furthers the so-
cietal common good such that it makes the individuals within the sys-
tem maximally happy.  Wilson states: 
The wisest and most benign constitution of a rational and moral system is 
that, in which the degree of private affection, most useful to the individ-
ual, is, at the same time, consistent with the greatest interest of the sys-
tem; and in which the degree of social affection, most useful to the sys-
 
124 Id. at 249–50. 
125 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, As a Member of Society, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 258, 254–
55 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1895) [hereinafter As a Member of Society]. 
126 Id. at 255 (“The love of posterity, of kindred, of country, and of mankind—all these are 
only so many different modifications of [] universal self-love.”). 
127 Id. at 257. 
128 Id. at 258–59. 
129 Id. at 266. 
130 Id. at 265–66. 
131 Id. at 266–67. 
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tem, is, at the same time, productive of the greatest happiness to the in-
dividual.132 
In the Wilsonian picture, this describes man in what he called natural 
society.  Natural society is society prior to the imposition of civil gov-
ernment.133  It is from this natural society where citizens, standing 
equal to each other, form a government to improve their happi-
ness.134  The creation of the union creates a mutual obligation be-
tween the collective and the individual.135  Since it is citizens who 
come together and form civil government through popular consent, 
these citizens are the sovereign in the Wilsonian conception of the 
state.136  This popular sovereignty serves as the ground for govern-
ment and the law. 
3   On The Extended Federal Republic 
Later in the Lectures on Law, Wilson describes four possible ways 
that the United States government could have been established.  The 
first way that the state could have been constructed was by having a 
single government; a further possibility was by distinct unconnected 
states; the third possibility was having two or more confederacies; and 
the final possibility was one federal republic.137  Wilson ends up argu-
ing for the extended federal republic, primarily for practical reasons.  
He argues that one government presiding over an expansive territory 
would require a system of despotism to administrate, while separate 
small states would be subject to war and fall prey to foreign forces.  
Finally, two large confederacies would similarly cause animosity and 
almost as much strife as smaller unconnected states.138  For Wilson the 
extended federal republic has two major advantages.  First, it is large 
enough so that it will not be subject to attack or destruction from for-
eign powers like small commonwealths.139  The federal republic, next, 
 
132 Id. at 270. 
133 Id. at 272–73. 
134 Id. at 272 (“It is from [the] union of wills and of strength, that the state or body politic 
results.”). 
135 Id. 
136 See id. at 280–81 (explaining that people have the power to retain or renounce their right 
of citizenship). 
137 Id. at 536. 
138 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, As a Member of a Confederation—A History of Confederacies, in 1 THE 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 285, 308 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1895) [hereinafter A Histo-
ry of Confederacies] (“By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the 
great collision of interests, apparently or really different or contrary, in the whole extent 
of their dominion, would be broken, and, in a great measure, disappear in the several 
parts.”). 
139 Id. at 310. 
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offers the advantage of being easier to administer.140  The component 
parts of this federal republic are, of course, states.  Wilson conceives 
of the relationship between the states and the federal government as 
amicable.141  The states are responsible for their internal regulation 
while the federal government is responsible for the common good of 
the whole union.142  Wilson states, “with regard to those matters, 
which affect the general interests of the whole union, a confederated 
republic should be considered and should act as a single government 
or nation.”143 
Wilson calls the confederated republic a union of “hearts and af-
fections” and “counsels and interests.”144  While the component parts 
in the confederated republic are still focused on the common good, 
these parts can sometimes become too intensely focused on them-
selves.  This is where the problem of factions enters.  On his account, 
factions are merely grouping where the social operations have be-
come too intense.  Wilson states, “[F]action itself is frequently noth-
ing else than a warm but inconsiderate ebullition of our social pro-
pensities.”145  The intense competitive spirit is something that Wilson 
hopes to capture and use in the republic, rather than crush.  Contra 
Madison, Wilson states that the spirit that animates factions “is of in-
dispensible necessity” and “that it should be regulated, guided, and 
controlled.”146  Ultimately, he argues that this spirit could be har-
nessed into patriotism for the Union rather than the faction.147  Wil-
son argues that such an intense patriotism will flow to the union of 
the states because the union is focused on the common good.148  In 
an instance where the state and the union are in conflict, one will fo-
cus their patriotism on the entity of the union because of its orienta-
tion to the common good and the fact that individuals benefit when 
the common good is served.149 
 
140 Id. at 312. 
141 See id. at 312–13. 
142 See id. (“In this kind of republic, the rights of internal legislation may be reserved to all 
the states, . . . while the adjustment of [the states’] several claims, the power of peace and 
war, the regulation of commerce, the right of entering into treaties, the authority of taxa-
tion, and the direction and government of the common force of the confederacy may be 
vested in the national government.”). 
143 Id. at 315. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 316. 
147 Id. at 316–17. 
148 Id. at 318–19. 
149 Id. 
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C. Framing Differences 
A closer look at the work of James Wilson and the authors of The 
Federalist show that there were at least two different conceptions of 
human nature at work in the minds of the Framers.  Both of these 
theories of human nature implicate different lines of philosophical 
tradition and anchor themselves into a greater debate between two 
titans of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Thomas Reid.  
Madison’s reliance upon Hume in Federalist No. 10 leaves him with a 
more pessimistic view of human nature and a very different concep-
tion of factions than Wilson.  Humans and groups work for their own 
interests and passions in the world of The Federalist.  It is from this 
fact, and the natural diversity of interests, that factions form and that 
the threat of tyranny emerges.  The solutions to this problem are the 
extended republic and federalism.  The Wilsonian picture of the ex-
tended confederate republic is grounded in a more pragmatic de-
fense.  This is because his Reidian view of human nature does not in-
volve a conception of man as such an antagonistic creature.  The 
virtue of the confederate republic is that it solves the practical prob-
lems of administration without despotism while minimizing the for-
eign influence and interstate animosities.  The problem of factions 
gets solved incidentally by solving these larger problems.  The solu-
tion is through a guided focus of the spirit of these factions into pat-
riotism for the United States as a union for the preservation of the 
common good. 
These different views on human nature also produced different 
conceptions of the relationship between the state and the federal 
government.  Wilson conceived of the relationship as primarily har-
monious.  The state has domain to conduct its own administration, 
whereas the national government is responsible for the common 
good of the nation.  On the other hand, The Federalist version of fed-
eralism is more oriented to viewing the relationship between the 
states and the nation government as essential to adding another 
check on the threat of despotism. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the political principles of 
the United States derive from a European philosophical tradition.  
That tradition encompassed both natural law theory and the work of 
the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers.  While the Framers were 
working within a unified intellectual tradition they had differing 
views on man’s nature.  The authors of The Federalist seem to be more 
indebted to the work of David Hume when discussing the structure of 
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government, whereas James Wilson crucially follows Thomas Reid.  
These different views on man resulted in different justifications for 
core features of our governmental system.  This core difference hints 
at a bigger problem for judges focused on the original meaning or 
intention at the time of the framing of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
A. Originalism 
In the 1980s a new movement of constitutional interpretation be-
gan to firmly entrench itself in legal academia and practice.150  This 
school of interpretation has come to be known as originalism.  
Originalism developed as a reaction against the expansive constitu-
tional jurisprudence of the Warren Court.151  Since its roots were laid 
it has developed into a popular, albeit controversial, method of con-
stitutional interpretation.152  In its most general sense originalism is a 
method of interpretation which seeks to find meaning through exam-
ining the understanding of the constitutional text at the time of its 
enactment.153  This method of interpretation generally focuses on the 
understanding of the text around the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention.154  There are two types of originalism that do not always get 
properly distinguished in popular discourse.  The first type of 
originalism focuses on the original intent of the Framers to resolve 
constitutional textual ambiguities.155  The second, and currently the 
most popular, form of originalism focuses on the original meaning of 
the constitutional text at the framing.156  Instead of looking at the sub-
jective intent of the Framers, originalists who focus on orginal mean-
ing look at the “objectified” intent of the Framers.157  These 
originalists examine the language of the text to ascertain what the 
 
150 See generally Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999). 
151 Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:  A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 392–93 
(2013). 
152 See Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 663, 669–72 (2009) (noting how originalism has expanded to include some prom-
inent liberal adherents). 
153 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 661–62 (2009) (describing 
originalism as “often refer[ring] to the normative constitutional interpretive theory that 
instructs judges . . . to look primarily to the original understanding of a particular clause’s 
ratifying generation”). 
154 Id. at 689–90 (demonstrating that judges employing originalism often cite to the Conven-
tion or state ratifying conventions occurring during the same time period). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 662. 
157 Id. 
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Framers would have expected their language to mean.158  Keith Whit-
tington describes two conditions of originalism focused on meaning.  
These conditions are that (1) meaning is fixed at the time that the 
text is adopted and (2) that the words constrain the meaning of con-
stitutional doctrines.159  Originalism is justified by its adherents as the 
theory of interpretation that is most consistent with democratic theo-
ry.160 
B. The Judicial Use of The Federalist 
The Federalist has played a crucial role in the new originalist pro-
gram of interpretation.  Professors Corley, Howard, and Nixon ana-
lyzed the use of the original documents in Supreme Court cases in 
the latter half of the twentieth century.  They found that from 1953 to 
1984 The Federalist Papers accounted for 34% of Supreme Court cita-
tions to authority.161  The Court in that time period cited to The Feder-
alist 101 times.162  The next closest source cited was Justice Joseph Sto-
ry’s Commentary, accounting for only thirty-six citations.163  The use of 
The Federalist Papers has increased dramatically since the 1940s.164  In a 
similar study of all non-legal sources of citations used by the Supreme 
Court, it was found that The Federalist alone accounted for 10.3% of 
citations during the time period from 1989 to 1998, beating out 
newspaper sources and internet sources while only barely coming in 
behind law journal articles.165 
The use of The Federalist has not been uncontroversial.  Research 
has shown that as Justices get more conservative in ideology they be-
come more likely to cite to The Federalist.166  The citations to The Feder-
alist are mostly used in cases involving governmental power and are 
used as a tactical tool.167  Originalist Justices have frequently relied on 
The Federalist Papers in their opinions and dissents.168  Two areas of 
 
158 Whittington, supra note 151, at 379. 
159 Id. at 378. 
160 Greene, supra note 153, at 665. 
161 Pamela C. Corley et al., The Supreme Court and Opinion Content:  The Use of The Federalist Pa-
pers, 58 POLI. RES. Q. 329, 330 (2005). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 332. 
165 John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court:  Nonlegal Material in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 
L. LIBR. J.  427, 432 (2002). 
166 Corley et al., supra note 161, at 333. 
167 Id. at 336. 
168 Id. at 333; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Morrison, 529, 638 U.S. 598 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Printz v. 
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constitutional law where The Federalist has been cited numerously by 
the Supreme Court are in the recent developments to both the Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine and the Commerce Clause.  In Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court was tasked with 
deciding whether the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(“SAMTA”) had to comply with a federal law regulating wage and 
overtime requirements of employees.169  The Court ultimately held 
that SAMTA did have to comply with the law because Congress had 
the power to regulate such activities under its Commerce Clause 
power and because it was not “destructive” of state sovereignty.170  In 
crafting the majority opinion and the dissent, the Justices made about 
twenty references to The Federalist.  The majority opinion authored by 
Justice Harry Blackmun, primarily used The Federalist to argue that 
“the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special re-
straints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the 
workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete 
limitations on the objects of federal authority.”171  Justice Lewis Powell 
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor both authored dissents similarly 
relying on The Federalist.  In their dissents though, they used The Fed-
eralist to argue the opposite conclusion from the majority.  Justice 
O’Connor cited Federalist No. 51 to suggest that the powers of the 
state and federal government were to be distinct and separate in or-
der to “produce efficient government and protect the rights of the 
people.”172  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion restricting federal 
governmental power over states in New York v. United States similarly 
cited The Federalist.173 
Citations to The Federalist fill the seminal opinions of the 
Rehnquist Court’s revival of federalism.174  The use of The Federalist in 
seminal cases has continued under the Roberts Court.  In National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John Roberts, 
writing for the majority, quoted The Federalist when arguing that the 
regulation of inactivity was not a constitutional exercise of the Court’s 
Commerce Clause powers.  Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (Scalia, J.); United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
169 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985). 
170 Id. at 554–56. 
171 Id. at 552. 
172 Id. at 582. 
173 See generally 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
174 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 2195 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States. v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned.  
James Madison explained that the Commerce Clause was “an addition 
which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.” 
. . . The Government’s theory would erode those limits, permitting Con-
gress to reach beyond the natural extent of its authority, “everywhere ex-
tending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.”175 
C.  Wilson and the Originalist Project 
The previous investigation into the deeper tradition that created 
the Constitution revealed a deep philosophical divide between crucial 
Framers James Wilson and the authors of The Federalist.  This deep di-
vide between these Framers created three possible implications for 
originalism and constitutional interpretation.  Deep philosophical 
disagreement can either have skeptical implications, methodological 
implications, or interpretative implications. 
1.  Skeptical Implications 
The existence of deep philosophical divides could be interpreted 
to cast a shadow of skepticism on the whole originalist venture.  The 
deepness of this problem is exemplified by Wilson’s and Madison’s 
discussion on factions.  On a surface level reading of the Lectures on 
Law and The Federalist, it is clear that both Framers used the word 
“faction” and felt that factions were a problem for democracy.  None-
theless, beyond that surface reading, Wilson and Madison had two 
very different ideas of what a faction actually was and used the word 
“faction” to mean very different things.  This is not a matter of mere 
semantics because, as we have seen, these two different conceptions 
of factions result in different solutions and derive from deeper divi-
sions in political and moral philosophy.  This example shows that the 
Framers, could, and in this case did, assign different meanings to es-
sential concepts of our government.  These different meanings thus 
necessitate different expectations of how the concepts would come to 
be used.  Even for the originalist who focuses on objectified intent 
this creates a problem.  The point of originalism is to preserve the 
meaning at the time of enactment.  Originalism that searches for ob-
jectified intent must, when faced with multiple meanings, find the 
most reasonable meaning.  But, in the case where there are multiple 
deep differences in meaning, the objectified intent will certainly dif-
 
175 Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 2566, 2589, 2590 (2012) (citations omitted) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)). 
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fer from the actual meanings at the time of enactment.  The judicial 
creation of a meaning that was not agreed upon at enactment and 
the application of that fictional understanding to legislation does not 
seem to do the work of preserving democratic values that originalist 
desire. 
2.  Methodological Implications 
As Justice Antonin Scalia states, when referring to originalism, “Its 
greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty of applying it correct-
ly . . . it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original under-
standing of an ancient text.”176  Justice Scalia goes on to describe how 
originalism requires the evaluation of historical documents and 
sometimes seems “better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”177  
Since the originalists purport to desire to discover the original under-
standing of the text of the Constitution at enactment, relying so heav-
ily on one source to understand that original meaning is intellectually 
dishonest.  In relying so heavily on The Federalist, the originalist judges 
are ignoring other equally influential Framers of the United States 
Constitution, like James Wilson, who presented a jurisprudential view 
arguably more sophisticated than the authors of The Federalist.  
Originalist judges who are genuinely interested in arriving at the orig-
inal understanding of text, and not of cherry picking their sources in 
order to further a certain view of governmental power, must take se-
riously all the sources that could elucidate the original meaning of 
pieces of the United States Constitution. 
3.  Interpretive Implications 
In Garcia, Justice Blackmun makes two citations to James Wilson’s 
speeches at the Constitutional Convention.178  Wilson’s view of federal 
and state interactions was far more harmonious than that found in 
The Federalist.  James Wilson’s political and legal philosophy was fo-
cused on a strong national government.179  This suggests that individ-
uals who are interested in originalism yet also desire not to support 
the federalism of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts may have a 
friend in James Wilson.  A deeper attention paid to the work of Wil-
 
176 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989). 
177 Id. at 857. 
178 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985). 
179 See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 1742–
1798, at 148 (1997). 
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son helps dispel the myth that originalists must arrive at conclusions 
that are restrictive of governmental powers. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Constitution stands as a magnificent and mon-
umental document.  But, in recognizing its greatness, the fact it was 
the result of centuries of intellectual thought should not be over-
looked.  Framers James Wilson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
and John Jay shared that intellectual tradition but still had substantive 
differences.  These differences, interestingly enough, still resulted in 
the production of the same document, though with different justifi-
cations.  In order to give an accurate picture of our past and where 
American law can develop, judges committed to seriously looking 
back at the work of the Framers must not obscure the fact that fun-
damental differences existed in the ways that the Framers conceived 
of the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
